The Sinking of the Belgrano

My interest in the sinking of the Belgrano was re-awakened by a recent Guardian article. The article wasn't that interesting but a comment below it mentioned that the Belgrano was part of an overall attack by the Argentinian fleet and air-force. I had watched a few documentaries and read a few books on the Falklands War so I thought I knew a lot about it. It turns out, I did not so I looked up the Wikipedia article and found this map:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ARA.Belgrano.sunk.svg

which shows the Argentinian attacks from the North and the South,  as well as a time-line.

T1: Dawn 1st May
T2: 5am 2nd May
x: 17:57 2nd May

The first thing I noticed was that the Belgrano was clearly heading towards Argentina when she was sunk, even though she was zig-zagging. One of the main reasons for a ship in a war-zone to zig-zag is to avoid a submarine. The zig-zagging accounts for the controversy and claims, counter-claims about the exact heading of the Belgrano when she was sunk; what cannot be denied is that her overall direction of travel is towards Argentina.

The second, more crucial aspect, is the timing. Thirteen hours between the abortive attacks and the Belgrano being sunk. The reason that this is crucial is because the narrative promoted by Admiral 'Sandy' Woodward sees the sinking as the result of a tactical decision, his decision and his alone, in response to an immediate and mortal threat to the UK fleet around the Falklands.

Thirteen hours is a long time, particularly in modern warfare or even in the context of naval warfare. An immediate and mortal threat means that guns and weapons are trained and locked, that both sides are committed to killing each other. The Belgrano was 200 miles plus from the UK fleet, heading homewards after an abortive mission, with no air-cover, in bad weather. She might have had the UK fleet on long-range radar, but she was too far away to shell the fleet; she carried no missiles.

Could the Belgrano have made a last ditch-attempt at attacking the fleet with just her and her two escorts? Possibly, but I think not. It would have been suicidal. The Sea Harriers would have intercepted her well before she got within shooting range. No air-cover is fatal for any naval mission.  The best contra-indication of a threat is her crew's behavior on perceiving a threat. My guess - and at this stage it's only a guess given my data-source - is that they had spotted the Conqueror and started zig-zagging. One of the claims about the Belgrano is that she had up-to-date ASW kit, however, she failed to use it and worse,  behaved like a merchant ship when threatened. The Belgrano and her two escorts could have turned and fought the Conqueror, at the very least, depth-charging the hell out of the South Atlantic. At the very least, it would have made the Conqueror's job a lot harder. At best, they could have sunk the Conqueror. The behaviour of the Belgrano group at this point shows they had no stomach for fight, let alone a suicidal dash at the UK fleet.

So, she was no immediate threat. Was the decision Woodward's alone? The Rules Of Engagement that the British had at the time of the sinking said that these sort of decisions had to be radioed to Northwood to get confirmation. The commander on the spot could not sink a ship at his own behest. There were suspicions - accusations - that Thatcher had ordered the sinking but this was strenuously denied. However, the Guardian had an article about the latest release of state secrets under the 30 year rules. From this it is clear that Thatcher and a cabal of ministers had a meeting at about midday, GMT, on the 2nd May. At this meeting they ordered the destruction of the Belgrano.

A fuller time-line looks like this:

T2: The Belgrano calls off the mission
The Conqueror discovers the Belgrano, more than likely through satellite pictures.
C phones home, Woodward asks if he can sink her, cabinet permission is given.
B spots C and starts zig-zagging.
The Belgrano is sunk.

Some of the time-lag can be accounted for by the time the Conqueror takes in phoning home, a meeting is arranged, and a reply is sent. Still, the immediate threat is lessening by the second.

If the threat is not immediate, then why sink the Belgrano? The only considerations at this point are strategic.  The Belgrano is, indeed, a strategic target: sink it and the Argentinian Navy would never venture out of port again, so I suspect the reasoning went. I have no qualms with that decision, if the decision was straightforward and clear.

The problem - from Thatcher's and Woodwards' POV - of framing the decision as strategic is that, unlike a tactical decision, a strategic decision involves larger and woolier concerns. More alternatives can be fielded - a blockade, for instance. I suspect at this point, the lawyers and No 10 spin-doctors went into over-time, with much muttering about war-crimes. We will never know. A lot of the discussion has been red-lined, crucial pages from the Conqueror's log have gone missing.

The problem with the tactical threat narrative is the cover-up. It's telling that Woodward's language when talking about the tactical threat is abstract and wooly, when he comes to discussing the strategic threat that the Belgrano posed, his language is far more precise. It's also clear, from my analysis, that Woodward is being economical with the truth. The missing pages from the Conqueror's log. We now know, courtesy of the Guardian, that Thatcher was involved in the decision to sink the Belgrano, contrary to what she said in her autobiography. If they have nothing to hide, why the cover-up?